Highlights from The Untold History of Ramen

I just finished reading about half of The Untold History of Ramen by George Solt [Amazon]. I skipped most of the middle, where he explains ramen’s evolution in Japan through the 19th and 20th centuries, and focused instead on the bookends, where he talks about how ramen was brought to Japan by Chinese laborers, and how ramen eventually migrated to America and became a global phenomenon.

I love ramen. Anyway.

Below are some highlights from the book. Because author George Solt is foremost an academic and not a chef, the book is about far more than just the noodles and broth. A recipe book it is not. Nor food porn. More like nerd porn: You get a light brush across history, culture, economics, and in particular, international perceptions of Japan, and how Japan itself understands and interprets these perceptions. You can tell from his writing that he’s annoyed by the simplified and often sensational Western portrayals of Japan. Or maybe he’s just tired of it.

Highlights:

The overall transformation of eating into a form of entertainment with fetishistic undertones, known as the gourmet boom

while ramen tours, documentaries, and books all tended to move the still-forming noodle narrative in the direction of a nationalistic tale of improving Chinese foods, Tamamura instead viewed the new reverence for the dish as a sign of “the emptiness of Japanese affluence” in the post-high-growth era.

Third, and most crucial, Nakae contends, was the cramped living conditions of the urban tenement housing in which most Japanese families lived, which made dining at family restaurants “basically an escape from everyday life.”

Satomi claims that for him the value of the dish derives from its very status as a pedestrian, or “B-class,” food in contrast to the more rarified realm of soba noodles.

Like Menya Musashi, most new shops that opened after the late 1990s no longer used the term ramen in their names but had more traditional Japanese names instead.

One of the clearest signals of ramen’s dissociation from China and its rebranding as Japanese was the change in uniform chosen by ramen chefs.

In the late 1990s and 2000s, however, younger ramen chefs, inspired primarily by Kawahara Shigemi, founder of the ramen shop Ippūdō, started to wear Japanese Buddhist work clothing, known as samue. Usually worn by Japanese potters and other practitioners of traditional arts, the samue, usually in purple or black, was worn by craftsmen in eighteenth-century Japan and would not have been considered appropriate for the ramen chef prior to the 1990s rebranding

Another important physical change marking the new wave ramen shop was the use of large displays of poems and life advice composed by the store’s owner to underscore their seriousness about the work of making ramen.

Although American familiarity with instant ramen can be dated to the early 1970s with Nissin Foods’ release of the Top Ramen brand…

Japan slowly shed its reputation as an “economic animal” (an appellation dating back to the 1970s) and gained a new identity as an incubator of fashion and cultural trends on par with Western Europe.

Japan’s passion for ramen began to define Japan itself; the more the Japanese defined ramen in national terms, the more the nation became identified with the noodle soup.

In one of his last postings, in June 2011, Wong noted that for health reasons he was eating much less ramen and had taken to a Mediterranean diet.

he told me I should consider increasing the water content of my noodles by 1 percent. Then he congratulated me on my success, rounded up his crew, and left.

Readers are informed that [David] Chang, like the rameniac Rickmond Wong, worked as an English teacher in Japan while learning to eat ramen but did not actually learn to speak much Japanese in the process (as is typical of many Americans living in the country)

Meehan draws attention to the vending machines dispensing alcoholic beverages, the displays of menus in the form of plastic food in front of restaurants, the clean automatic toilets, the gangsters with missing pinkies, and other well-worn aspects of life in Japan that foreigners unacquainted with the country never tire of writing about.

This was a breakthrough in American cinematic representations of Japan, and it was a dramatic departure from films with characters such as the Japanese widow who falls in love with the American who kills her husband (Last Samurai), the Japanese geisha who falls in love with the American who rescues her from the brutality of Japanese patriarchy (Memoirs of a Geisha), and the Japanese actors who serve as stage props or as jokes in and of themselves (Lost in Translation).

Eighty percent of ramen shops in Japan are independently owned, and small ramen shops remain resilient despite the struggles of most other independent food businesses since the 1990s.

The noren wake system, in which the ramen store owner provides a former worker who has at least a year of experience with his personal supply routes, broth and sauce recipes, and personal coaching, usually without any charge, has allowed for the spread of shops modeled after popular stores without any pyramid-like corporate structure.

Takenaka finds that Japan’s value can be located in the country’s smaller scale of production on average compared with the United States and its relative lack of capital concentration across industries, both of which allow for a culture of variation, eccentricity, and creativity to flourish.

Ramen has been the most prominent and successful global export of the Japanese restaurant industry since the internationalization of sushi in the 1980s, and it has become a global phenomenon in the last two decades.

what started as an exotic food from China famed for its affordability, quickness, and nourishing qualities developed into a staple of Japanese working-class cuisine,

The various categories into which the food is simultaneously placed (Japanese food, comfort food, “Chinese” fast food, nighttime post-drinking food, working-class lunch food, young people’s food, bachelor’s food)

“Why Strict Churches Are Strong”: Because followers give up more of their life outside the church

I recently read the academic article “Why Strict Churches Are Strong” [UChicago], which explains the phenomena of why stricter religions and denominations – eg, Orthodox Judaism, or Mormonism, or Sikhism – tend to have more active members and more growth, at least in recent generations.

The article is fascinating and widely cited, and largely uses rational choice theory to explain the outcome. My very basic understanding of rational choice theory is, “assume that people generally make choices out of rational self-interest”. Yes, I’m sure there’s a lot more to it.

The article’s conclusion:

The strength of strict churches is neither a historical coincidence nor a statistical artifact. Strictness makes organizations stronger and more attractive because it reduces free riding. It screens out members who lack commitment and stimulates participation among those who remain

Some highlights and excerpts:

Statistical studies have confirmed that denominational growth rates correlate strongly with “strictness” and its concomitants, and new historical research has revealed that the mainline’s share of the churchgoing population has been declining since the American Revolution

I shall argue that strict demands “strengthen”a church in three ways: they raise overall levels of commitment, they increase average rates of participation, and they enhance the net benefits of membership

The Mormon church has distinctive behavioral requirements and makes heavy demands on members’ time and money, yet is the fastest growing religion of the modern era

“Perhaps the gravest [peril] of all lies in the fact that these colonies are threatened as much by success as by failure…If they attain prosperity they attract a crowd of members who lack the enthusiasm and faith of the earlier ones and are attracted only by self-interest.” This perverse dynamic threatens all groups engaged in the production of collective goods, and it applies to enthusiasm, solidarity, and other social benefits no less than to material resources.

Instead of subsidizing participation, churches can penalize or prohibit alternative activities that compete for members’ resources. In mixed populations, such penalties and prohibitions tend to screen out the less committed members. They act like entry fees and thus discourage anyone not seriously interested in “buying” the product. Only those willing to pay the price remain.

Commenting on his religion’s distinctive dress and grooming requirements, a Sikh put it thus: “The Guru wanted to raise a body of men who would not be able to deny their faith when questioned, but whose external appearance would invite persecution and breed the courage to resist it

Relative to their more mainstream counterparts, members of sectarian groups – both Christian and Jewish – attend more religious services, contribute more money, and (in the Jewish case, at least) choose more of their closest friends from within their religion. They are also less involved in competing activities. They hold fewer memberships in outside groups, contribute less to outside causes, and have fewer outside friends.

Simply put, those most likely to join are those with the least to lose. Losses grow in proportion to both the quantity and the quality of one’s ties to the outside world. You are therefore less likely to join (or remain active in) an exclusive sect if you have an extensive set of social ties to friends and family outside the sect. You are more likely to join if you lack many such ties and are still more likely to join if you have friends or family in the sect.

Stark and Bainbridge (1985, p. 134) arrived at a conclusion that fits the rational choice model perfectly: “Many sects fail to grow (and are never transformed into churches) because their initial level of tension is so high as to cause their early social encapsulation. Once encapsulated, a sect may persist for centuries, depending on fertility and the ability to minimize defection, but it will rarely be able to recruit an outsider.”

They conclude that “particularly in dynamic social environments churches must engage in a continuing balancing act, trading off between religious traditions and social norms…A certain amount of tension with secular society is essential to success-the trick is finding, and maintaining, the right amount.”

Finally a very interesting chart:

“It is the ultimate goal of almost all human effort”

The power and omnipresence of the sexual drive: Next to the love of life it shows itself here as the strongest and most active of all motives, and incessantly lays claim to half the powers and thoughts of the younger portion of mankind. It is the ultimate goal of almost all human effort. It has an unfavourable influence on the most important affairs, interrupts every hour the most serious occupations, and sometimes perplexes for a while the greatest human minds…Sex is really the invisible point of all action and conduct, and peeps up everywhere in spite of all the veils thrown over it. It is the cause of war and the aim and object of peace,…the inexhaustible source of wit, the key to all allusions, and the meaning of all mysterious hints, of all unspoken offers and all stolen glances; it is the meditation of the young and often the old as well, the hourly thought of the unchaste and, even against their will, the constantly recurring imagination of the chaste.

From Irvin D. Yalom’s book The Schopenhauer Cure.

Before bitcoin forks there were many, many religion forks

In the cryptocurrency world, there is a lot of talk about soft and hard forks. Roughly speaking, a soft fork is when a cryptocurrency constructed on a blockchain splits into two branches, but the older branch is still compatible with the newer branch. It’s forward compatible. Examples of these soft forks include Bitcoin for much of its history, Ethereum, and Monero. A hard fork is when a cryptocurrency is split into two branches, but the two branches are incompatible and must develop separately. The canonical example is Bitcoin and Bitcoin Classic.

I’ve been studying religion a lot recently, and have noticed that forks are quite common in the world of religious traditions.

Just a few examples for your consideration:

Christianity hard-forked from Judaism after the death of Jesus Christ. I wouldn’t consider it a soft fork since Judaism, while sharing some views and practices with Christianity, is not forwards compatible per-se. A Jewish person wouldn’t consider herself Christian, nor vice-versa

Christianity continued to fork in the Great Schism with the development of the Eastern Orthodox branch, and then the further split between Catholicism and Protestantism as a result of Martin Luther and the Reformation. Again, these forks are probably closer to hard forks, since I don’t think Catholics consider themselves Protestant or Orthodox, although there is sometimes conversion and switching between the branches (more so, I think, between Catholicism and Protestantism due mostly to cultural and geographic differences).

Islam is somewhere between a soft fork and a hard fork of Judeo-Christianity, since Islam is a little bit backwards compatible, in the sense that Adam and Jesus among others, are seen as prophets in the Islamic tradition. But it’s also not technically a soft fork since neither Jews nor Christians consider themselves Muslims.

And Islam forked after Mohammed’s death into Sunni and Shi’a branches. And Sunni Islam went on to split further into traditions such as Sufism and Wahhabism.

Just a few more examples…

In Confucianism you have a soft fork, if you can even call it that, into differing schools of thought as best represented by Confucian disciples Mencius and Xunzi. This is probably closer to a soft fork since most Confucians probably believe, at least in part, in both schools of thought, and neither is so orthodox or exclusive as to reject the other.

And in Buddhism you have an incredible profusion of forks, from the original orthodox Theravada Buddhism into Mahayana, and then further on into Vajrayana and Zen Buddhism.

We could go on…

The Amish Church was founded by European Christians who believed only adults could freely choose Christ and the Church, and were against the baptism of babies. Mormonism is itself a branch of Restorationist Christianity, which itself is a long tradition that broke away from what was then the Catholic Church in the 15th century.

Anyway, forks are not exactly new. You could say that an even more fundamental kind of fork would be natural selection, the branching of single celled organisms into multicellular organisms, and then into plants and animals, and then into amphibians and reptiles and so on. So it’s kinda ad infinitum, but I just noticed such a fascinating parallel between the fork feuds in cryptocurrency – which has many religions undertones – and religious forks. Perhaps something to explore in a later post.

One thing we haven’t seen in cryptocurrencies, or maybe I’m unaware, are mergers. In religion, mergers – whether more formal mergers such as Zen Buddhism which fused elements of Buddhism and Daoism within a Japanese cultural context, or informal mergers, such as how most Americans today are culturally Protestant but increasingly believe or practice secularized aspects of Hinduism (yoga) and Buddhism (meditation) or merge religions in personal practices, such as Jewish Buddhists (JuBu’s for short).

Just food for thought. Both spaces – religion and crypto – are fascinating. Reach out if you have anything to add, edit, or discuss!

Everything you do is a signal, or highlights from The Elephant in the Brain

The following are some notes, followed by a lot of highlights, from the book Elephant in the Brain by Kevin Simler and Robin Hanson [Amazon].

The book is about, in a word, signals. Everything we do is – in small and often large part – a signal to others:

We talk to seem smart and build alliances.

We make art to attract mates.

We donate to charity to impress neighbors.

We laugh to let people know that we’re ok, it’s just a game.

We pray to belong to a group.

We vote to show our loyalty.

Even this blog is a massive signal :P

Signals, signals, signals. Oh, and sex. Signals and sex.

In fact, this quote buried in the book’s footnotes might be the underlying reason behind all of the seemingly complicated but ultimately simple reasons behind why we do what we do:

As the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer wrote about sexual love: “It is the ultimate goal of almost all human effort… . It knows how to slip its love-notes and ringlets even into ministerial portfolios and philosophical manuscripts”.

The below are all highlights copied verbatim from the book, which I highly recommend. Very much in the Yuval Harari “things are both more complicated and more simple than they seem” vein.

GENERAL HIGHLIGHTS

To understand the competitive side of human nature, we would do well to turn Matthew 7: 1 on its head: “Judge freely, and accept that you too will be judged.”

The essence of a norm, then, lies not in the words we use to describe it, but in which behaviors get punished and what form the punishment takes.

Collective enforcement, then, is the essence of norms. This is what enables the egalitarian political order so characteristic of the forager lifestyle.

Our ancestors did a lot of cheating. How do we know? One source of evidence is the fact that our brains have special-purpose adaptations for detecting cheaters. When abstract logic puzzles are framed as cheating scenarios, for example, we’re a lot better at solving them.

We assume that there is one person in each body, but in some ways we are each more like a committee whose members have been thrown together working at cross purposes.

There are dozens of schemes for how to divide up the mind. The Bible identifies the head and the heart. Freud gives us the id, ego, and superego. Iain McGilchrist differentiates the analytical left brain from the holistic right brain, while Douglas Kenrick gives us seven “subselves”: Night Watchman, Compulsive Hypochondriac, Team Player, Go-Getter, Swinging Single, Good Spouse, and Nurturing Parent.

What this means for self-deception is that it’s possible for our brains to maintain a relatively accurate set of beliefs in systems tasked with evaluating potential actions, while keeping those accurate beliefs hidden from the systems (like consciousness) involved in managing social impressions.

Or as Venkatesh Rao says, “We ‘shop around’ for careers. We look for prestigious brands to work for. We look for ‘fulfillment’ at work. Sometimes we even accept pay cuts to be associated with famous names. This is work as fashion accessory and conversation fodder”

All ads effectively have two audiences: potential product buyers, and potential product viewers who will credit the product owners with various desirable traits”

HUMOR AND LAUGHTER

The most important observation is that we laugh far more often in social settings than when we’re alone—30 times more often

When Provine studied 1,200 episodes of laughter overheard in public settings, his biggest surprise was finding that speakers laugh more than listeners—about 50 percent more, in fact.

“We’re just playing” is such an important message, it turns out, that many species have developed their own vocabulary for it. Dogs, for example, have a “play bow”—forearms extended, head down, hindquarters in the air—which they use to initiate a bout of play. Chimps use an open-mouthed “play face,” similar to a human smile, or double over and peer between their legs at their play partners.

We don’t laugh continuously throughout a play session, only when there’s something potentially unpleasant to react to.

In any given comedic situation, humor precedes and causes laughter, but when we step back and take a broader perspective, the order is reversed. Our propensity to laugh comes first and provides the necessary goal for humor to achieve.

First you need to get two or more people together. Then you must set the mood dial to “play.” Then you need to jostle things, carefully, so that the dial feints in the direction of “serious,” but quickly falls back to “play.” And only then will the safe come open, releasing the precious laugher locked inside.

what laughter illustrates is precisely the fact that our norms and other social boundaries aren’t etched in stone with black-and-white precision, but ebb and shift through shades of gray, depending on context.

If exchanging information were the be-all and end-all of conversation, then we would expect people to be greedy listeners and stingy speakers. Instead, we typically find ourselves with the opposite attitude

Our hearing apparatus remains evolutionarily conservative, very similar to that of other apes, while our speaking apparatus has been dramatically re-engineered. The burden of adaptation has fallen on speaking rather than listening.

you’re looking for a backpack full of tools that are both new to you and useful to the things you care about. If Henry can consistently delight you with new, useful artifacts, it speaks to the quality of his backpack and therefore his value as an ally.

In casual conversation, listeners have a mixture of these two motives. To some extent we care about the text, the information itself, but we also care about the subtext, the speaker’s value as a potential ally.

The competition to show off as a potential lover or leader also helps explain why language often seems more elaborate than necessary to communicate ideas—what the linguist John Locke calls “verbal plumage.”

listeners generally prefer speakers who can impress them wherever a conversation happens to lead, rather than speakers who steer conversations to specific topics where they already know what to say.

If conversation were primarily about reciprocal exchange, we’d be tempted to habitually deprecate what our partners were offering, in order to “owe” less in return

We find a similar regulatory function of laughter when a father throws his three-year-old daughter into the air and catches her. If the toddler laughs, dad knows she’s enjoying the game and wants it to continue. If instead she gives a yelp or an alarmed cry, dad knows to stop at once.

ART

Ellen Dissanayake’s characterization of art as anything “made special,” that is, not for some functional or practical purpose but for human attention and enjoyment

“During the breeding season,” writes Miller, “males spend virtually all day, every day, building and maintaining their bowers.” The reward for all this effort is more mating opportunities. A successful male bowerbird can mate with as many as 30 females in a single mating season.

human art is more than just a courtship display, that is, an advertisement of the artist’s value as a potential mate. It also functions as a general-purpose fitness display, that is, an advertisement of the artist’s health, energy, vigor, coordination, and overall fitness. Fitness displays can be used to woo mates, of course, but they also serve other purposes like attracting allies or intimidating rivals. And humans use art for all of these things.

Consider Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, celebrated for its beautiful detail, the surreal backdrop, and of course the subject’s enigmatic smile. More visitors have seen the Mona Lisa in person—on display behind bulletproof glass at the Louvre—than any other painting on the planet. But when researchers Jesse Prinz and Angelika Seidel asked subjects to consider a hypothetical scenario in which the Mona Lisa burned to a crisp, 80 percent of them said they’d prefer to see the ashes of the original rather than an indistinguishable replica.

The advent of photography wreaked similar havoc on the realist aesthetic in painting. Painters could no longer hope to impress viewers by depicting scenes as accurately as possible, as they had strived to do for millennia. “In response,” writes Miller, “painters invented new genres based on new, non-representational aesthetics: impressionism, cubism, expressionism, surrealism, abstraction. Signs of handmade authenticity became more important than representational skill. The brush-stroke became an end in itself.”

Fashion often distinguishes itself from mere clothing by being conspicuously impractical, non-functional, and sometimes even uncomfortable.

We’re eager to evaluate art, reflect on it, criticize it, calibrate our criticisms with others, and push ourselves to new frontiers of discernment. And we do this even in art forms we have no intention of practicing ourselves. For every novelist, there are 100 readers who care passionately about fiction, but have no plans ever to write a novel.

Miller’s observation that “sexually mature males have produced almost all of the publicly displayed art throughout human history”

CHARITY

Anonymous donation, for example, is extremely rare. Only around 1 percent of donations to public charities are anonymous.

People seldom initiate donations on their own; up to 95 percent of all donations are given in response to a solicitation.

In 2011, Americans donated $ 298 billion to charity, of which only an estimated 13 percent ($ 39 billion) went to help foreigners.

Many studies have found that people, especially men, are more likely to give money when the solicitor is an attractive member of the opposite sex. Men also give more to charity when nearby observers are female rather than male.

As early as the 12th century, the Jewish philosopher Maimonides distinguished various “levels of charity” in part based on how anonymous the donor was. Acts of charity in which the donor is known to the recipient were considered less noble than anonymous acts.

EDUCATION

Each of the first three years of high school or college (the years that don’t finish a degree) are worth on average only about a 4 percent salary bump. But the last year of high school and the last year of college, where students complete a degree, are each worth on average about a 30 percent higher salary.

In a North Carolina school district, a one-hour delay in school start time—for example, from 7: 30 a.m. to 8: 30 a.m.—resulted in a 2 percentile gain in student performance.

a lot of the value of education lies in giving students a chance to advertise the attractive qualities they already have.
Caplan, for example, estimates that signaling is responsible for up to 80 percent of the total value of education.

This suggests that public K–12 schools were originally designed as part of nation-building projects, with an eye toward indoctrinating citizens and cultivating patriotic fervor. In this regard, they serve as a potent form of propaganda. We can see this function especially clearly in history and civics curricula, which tend to emphasize the rosier aspects of national issues.

Children are expected to sit still for hours upon hours; to control their impulses; to focus on boring, repetitive tasks; to move from place to place when a bell rings; and even to ask permission before going to the bathroom (think about that for a second). Teachers systematically reward children for being docile and punish them for “acting out,” that is, for acting as their own masters. In fact, teachers reward discipline independent of its influence on learning, and in ways that tamp down on student creativity. Children are also trained to accept being measured, graded, and ranked, often in front of others. This enterprise, which typically lasts well over a decade, serves as a systematic exercise in human domestication.

One recent study (Bruze 2015) suggests that, in Denmark, people are earning “on the order of half of their returns to schooling through improved marital outcomes.”

John Gatto said what many teachers surely recognize, but few are willing to state so baldly. “Schools and schooling,” he said, “are increasingly irrelevant to the great enterprises of the planet. No one believes anymore that scientists are trained in science classes or politicians in civics classes or poets in English classes. The truth is that schools don’t really teach anything except how to obey orders”

HEALTHCARE

Patients in higher-spending regions, who get more treatment for their conditions, don’t end up healthier, on average, than patients in lower-spending regions who get fewer treatments.

Today, it’s a better drug for reducing blood pressure. Tomorrow, a new and improved surgical technique. Why don’t these individual improvements add up to large gains in our aggregate studies? There’s a simple and surprisingly well-accepted answer to this question: most published medical research is wrong. (Or at least overstated.)

Patients and their families are often dismissive of simple cheap remedies, like “relax, eat better, and get more sleep and exercise.” Instead they prefer expensive, technically complicated medical care—gadgets, rare substances, and complex procedures, ideally provided by “the best doctor in town.” Patients feel better when given what they think is a medical pill, even when it is just a placebo that does nothing. And patients feel even better if they think the pill is more expensive.

Roughly 11 percent of all medical spending in the United States, for example, goes toward patients in their final year of life. And yet it’s one of the least effective (therapeutic) kinds of medicine.

As Alex Tabarrok puts it, “More people die from medical mistakes each year than from highway accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS and yet physicians still resist and the public does not demand even simple reforms.”

Investigators reported that people who reside in rural areas lived an average of 6 years longer than city dwellers, nonsmokers lived 3 years longer than smokers, and those who exercised a lot lived 15 years longer than those who exercised only a little.

Doctors, having witnessed the futility of heroic end-of-life care, are famously keen on avoiding it for themselves, when they become terminally ill.

RELIGION

They walk seven times counterclockwise around the Kaaba—the black, cube-shaped building at the center of the world’s largest mosque. (See Figure 5.) They also shave their heads; run back and forth between two hills; stand vigil from noon until sunset; drink water from the Zamzam well; camp overnight on the plain of Muzdalifa; sacrifice a lamb, goat, cow, or camel; and cast stones at three pillars in a symbolic stoning of the devil.

Many Jews, for example, consider themselves atheists, and yet continue practicing Judaism—going to temple, keeping kosher, and celebrating the high holidays.

Compared to their secular counterparts, religious people tend to smoke less, donate and volunteer more, have more social connections, get and stay married more, and have more kids. They also live longer, earn more money, experience less depression, and report greater happiness and fulfillment in their lives.

A religion, therefore, isn’t just a set of propositional beliefs about God and the afterlife; it’s an entire social system.

So whenever people make a sacrifice to your god, they’re implicitly showing loyalty to you—and to everyone else who worships at the same altar.

It’s easy to say, “I’m a Muslim,” but to get full credit, you also have to act like a Muslim—by answering the daily calls to prayer, for example, or undertaking the Hajj.

Yes, you probably have “better things to do” than listen to a sermon, which is precisely why you get loyalty points for listening patiently. In other words, the boredom of sermons may be a feature rather than a bug.

Note that positions of greater trust and authority require larger sacrifices; if the Pope had children, for example, his loyalty would be split between his family and his faith, and Catholics would have a harder time trusting him to lead the Church.

Note, however, that a community’s supply of social rewards is limited, so we’re often competing to show more loyalty than others—to engage in a “holier than thou” arms race.

All these sacrifices work to maintain high levels of commitment and trust among community members, which ultimately reduces the need to monitor everyone’s behavior. The net result is the ability to sustain cooperative groups at larger scales and over longer periods of time.

A 2012 Gallup poll, for instance, found that atheists came in dead last in electability, well behind other marginalized groups like Hispanics and gay people. In fact, Americans would sooner see a Muslim than an atheist in the Oval Office.

As Jason Weeden and colleagues have pointed out, religions can be understood, in part, as community-enforced mating strategies.

Our species, for reasons that aren’t entirely clear, is wired to form social bonds when we move in lockstep with each other. This can mean marching together, singing or chanting in unison, clapping hands to a beat, or even just wearing the same clothes.

The particular strangeness of Mormon beliefs, for example, testifies to the exceptional strength of the Mormon moral community. To maintain such stigmatizing beliefs in the modern era, in the face of science, the news media, and the Internet, is quite the feat of solidarity.

Haidt: “To resolve [the puzzle of religious participation], either you have to grant that religiosity is (or at least, used to be) beneficial or you have to construct a complicated, multi-step explanation of how humans in all known cultures came to swim against the tide of adaptation and do so much self-destructive religious stuff”

POLITICS

the literature on voting makes it clear that people mostly don’t vote for their material self-interest, that is, for the candidates and policies that would make them personally better off.

Real voters, however, show remarkably little concern for whether their votes are likely to make a difference. Swing states see only a modest uptick in turnout, somewhere between one and four percentage

When people are asked the same policy question a few months apart, they frequently give different answers—not because they’ve changed their minds, but because they’re making up answers on the spot, without remembering what they said last time.

The kicker? Stalin himself wasn’t even in the room. His cult of personality was strong enough to sustain 11 minutes of applause even in his absence. At least 600,000 people were killed in these ways during Stalin’s purges.

This helps explain why voters feel little pressure to be informed. As long as we adopt the “right” beliefs—those of our main coalitions—we get full credit for loyalty.

Within nations, our most devoted activists are plausibly those who see themselves as political “soldiers” fighting for a cause, but whom opponents see as political “terrorists,” since their actions risk hurting both themselves and others.